Introduction
Before attempting to draw together and underline some of the main themes of the workshop, let me first express our thanks to the Laidlaw Foundation without whose generosity and encouragement this meeting could never have occurred. Such was the richness of our discussions over the .three days that it would be possible for someone with another professional background or orientation to select out an entirely different set of themes for discussion. One of the keys to the success of the meeting was the bringing together of .so ,many knowledgeable, thoughtful and artlcu!ate people from a variety of geographical areas and professional backgrounds who shared their experiences and perceptions of the complex problems all of us face in our dealings with so difficult a group of youngsters. I particularly thank the Foundation for bringing Drs. Donald Gair, (Boston), Albert Solnit (Yale), Marguente Warren (Albany), Miss Joan Cooper (Great Britain) and Dr. Hans Mohr from Germany to share their wisdom, their experiences and themselves with us. W?en dealing with a difficult, complex, multifaceted problem, it is all too easy to compound the issue by seizing one of two false but easy outs: to "pass the buck" to s?me other professional or agency, or to find someone to scapegoat for having mishandled or neglected his part of a com- Can. Psychiatr. Assoc. J. Vol. 23 (1978) bined intervention. These are very human tendencies. We are all aware of the magnitude of the difficulties and the limits to our own effectiveness and control. As a result, it is often much easier to define the problem as somebody else's or to find someone to blame for the failure of the patient to respond than it is to come face to face with the gap between our wish for results and our inability to achieve them.
If nothing else was accomplished in three days -and I do not suspect for a moment that to be the case -all of us will find it more difficult in the future to indulge in that kind of buck-passing and scapegoating. One of the major benefits of an interdisciplinary workshop of this kind takes place over the dinner tables and outside the formal sessions. We had an opportunity to meet and get to know mem bers of allied professions who struggle from their vantage points to deal with the same group of adolescents that confounds us. We were exposed to their mandate as they see it, their problems, their frustrations and, most of all, their doubts. This . was a luxury we rarely experience in the normal course of busy professional lives. It had a humanizing effect on all who were part of it, making it more difficult to respond to each other just as stereotypes rather than as equally thoughtful and dedicated individuals groping towards a common goal. The danger of "buck-passing" and scapegoating is particularly great whenever a number of professionals and agencies, especially from different disciplines, are interdependent in their attempts to grapple with a complex and frustrating task. Any such interdependent system has an inherent tendency to break down, leaving the individuals or agencies to act against rather than with each other. When this .occurs, one might paraphrase Mar-gue~lte Warren* and say that the professionals and agencies are functioning at an 1 3 level. When no one ever wins such a struggle, the one who invariably stands to lose. the most is the client. Repeatedly dunng the conference, it was agreed that the problems of youngsters under discussion are diverse, complex and multifaceted. The need for individualized and combin.ed intervention from a variety of professionals and agencies was discussed In actual practice, this kind of collaborat ion is achieved and maintained with some difficulty, if at all. There are three main reasons for this. First, if it is to be effective collaboration is time-consuming, and most of us are sufficiently busy that unless we assign it top priority it is one of the first things to be sacrificed in the face of competing demands for our time and attention. Secondly, we do not always trust each other, nor do we even talk the same language. We saw in this workshop repeatedly, how often we explain or diagnose the same child in a different way, or use the same term to describe phenomena that are not identical. Thirdly, even those who recognize the need for collaboration often want to collaborate on their own terms. Bu.t effective collaboration usually requires some surrender of individual or agency autonomy for the sake of the case as a whole. This is not always easily done. But unless it is achieved, it is the child who will suffer as a result of our territorial strug~les. In many such cases, the precise solution agreed upon is less important than the fact that all involved have reached agreement and are working with rather than against each other. One important consequence of the meeting, hopefully, will be that having been given the chance to learn and appreciate each others' roles and pr~blem.s a bit better, we have begun to build bndges between our professions that may lead to more effective collaboration in the future.
• An asterisk identifies statements made during the course of the wo~hhop. Speakers are identified in the separate listing of parucrpants to be found on pages vi. vii.
The Mythology of the "Impossible" Child In hi~response to Dr. Warren's paper, Dr. Clive Chamberlain* spoke of the mythology of the impossible child. There are two such myths that are dutifully trotted out to confuse the issue time and again.
The first is that all behaviour can be understood and treated. Most behaviour probably can be understood, if one has sufficient skills, time and experience in understanding behaviour, if one considers it important or even relevant to try to und~rstand why people behave as they do (which many people in the helping professions these days do not}; and if one is prepared to take the time to understand it. But just because behaviour can be understood does not necessarily mean that it can be changed. This is not always possible. If w~gathered together and selectively applied what we know, collectively we would do a considerably better job in dealing with this group of youngsters than has been done. But, as Robert Smith* has drawn to our atten~ion, not all the psychiatrists, psychologists or social workers in the world will solve the problem of delinquency. We can be helpful to selected individuals or groups of delinquents, but in the past, our professions have badly oversold what we had to offer.
At times, we have sounded absolutely messianic, as if we had all the answers, rather than a few leads. In the process we ?ave not only failed to help the youngsters Involved, but have badly damaged our professional credibility. The pu blic and the press will not easily let this be forgotten.
A secondmyth referred to by a number of speakers holds that our effectiveness as members of the helping professions would be compromised were we to exercise authority over our clients. This is in direct contradiction to an axiom basic to any effective intervention with this clinical population: one cannot facilitate growth or~reat successfully the omnipotent, antisocial youngster as long as he remains out of control. At any given time, one may choose not to exert one's control, but if the control resides in the hands of the child rather than in those of the therapist or agency, the youngster is not in effective treatment.
Problems Related to the Achievement and Maintenance of Control
In some cases, the necessary security and external control can be achieved through effective interaction between the youngsters and an adequate number of, experienced line staff who have ready access to the professional support and back-up they need. However, some of these youngsters are undoubtedly too violent, too unpredictable and too difficult to treat successfully unless they are first contained. This will at times require closed settings or, preferably, closed units within a total ,setting through which a child may progress, when ready, in a sequential manner as he shows the capacity to internalize controls. The government and the community have every right to expect us to do . everything possible to manage and, where we can, treat these youngsters. But they put all of us in an impossible bind, particularly the child care workers who man the front lines and are expected to deal with these difficult, unpleasant and often menacing youngsters, day after day. On the one hand, they tell us to look after these children but, at the same time, deny us the control that would make this possible. The Ontario Government's repeal of Section 8 of the Child Welfare Act, that section which allowed children or youth who are out of control to be sent to training school, was understandable and even laudable in its intent to keep training schools from being used as a dumping ground. But without the provision of alternative closed units to provide the necessary security for youth who could not otherwise be controlled, it has created an unworkable and frightening situation. Such units were promised, but not provided. Instead these "uncontrollable" youngsters were merely dumped back into the laps of the families, the Children's Aid Societies and the school boards who had been unable to handle them primarily. At the same time, the Provincial Government decreed that physical control of children by staff would not be considered acceptable. Line staff felt abandoned and undermined, both by their own agencies and by the Ministry. As Brian Taylor* put it: (4) When faced with defiant children, front line staff are losing their nerve, These children need physical control, and we are contributing to their "control panic" and their momentum if we fail to provide it . . . physical control is becoming a lost art. Applied improperly, it becomes destructive and counter-productive.
To be effective it must be swift and confident. it must initiate or inhibit an action and it may startle or shock but must not inflict pain. The growing number of seriously out-of-control children in the past two years -reflects a deterioration of person-to-person control. These children are disturbed, but their disturbance is exaggerated and complicated by failure after failure inside the helping system. Front line staff cannot be expected to cope with such difficult children without the security of knowing that their agency will support the use of physical control when necessary and when applied in a reasonable manner. Otherwise, both worker morale and the effectiveness of the therapeutic milieu will be seriously compromised.
Issues Related to Classification "Impossible" children are not a homogenous group. Therefore, there is a need for a system of classification that will serve four basic purposes:
• It will allow us to organize the way we define and group the youngsters in question. • It can be used to point the way to more precise, and therefore more effective, intervention, • It can gain general acceptance, thereby allowing those discussing cases or comparing results to be sure they are talking about the same children. • It can provide a structure around which we can organize the research so badly needed to extend our knowledge. Marguerite Warren has given us one classification. Philip Barker, (quoting Balbernie and Dockar-Drysdale) has given us another. They are very diffferent, though by no means incompatible. With more time and greater knowledge, one might even be able to relate one to the other; for example, Dockar-Drysdale's "frozen child" might be classified 1 2 by Dr. Warren. We are hot yet at the point where we can agree upon the ideal classification but we should, at least, be able to agree upon its characteristics. To be acceptable, any classification: 2 ) who has never had a primary caretaker relationship will need to be planned around providing for the child what Balbernie has termed a primary experience if he is to be engaged successfully in treatment. 4) It must be widely accepted in order to allow us to compare whom we are dealing with and what our results are. Without a common classification or, at the very least, an easy and accurate way of correlating two or three parallel classifications, our attempts to compare our experiences and to learn from those of others will fail. Our failure to achieve and to work from a common classification has resulted in our unwitting construction of a professional Tower of Babel, in that we all speak our own language and proceed in our own idiosyncratic ways. We desperately need to coordinate our research and treatment efforts if we are to avoid merely compounding each others' confusion.
Before arriving at an appropriate plan of treatment, an accurate diagnosis and an adequate formulation are necessary. But, as Julian Rubenstein* pointed out, the concepts of diagnosis and formulation are often unpopular with non-psychiatric colleagues in the field. At times, they see diagnosis as a vestigal remnant of an outdated medical model which is being forced on them by psychiatrists in a manouevre that is excluding, irrelevant and elitist.
But diagnosis and formulation are neither the property nor the prerogative of any single profession. Not all psychiatrists diagnose and formulate well. Also, it is by no means only psychiatrists who need to be able to diagnose and formulate a case. As Barker has pointed out, quoting Balbernie, before undertaking any intervention, one should be able to answer the following questions:
• What is damaged? What are the blocks to be removed, the distortions to be corrected? • What form of treatment is proposed, and what are the goals one hopes to achieve? • What are the specific contributions and responsibilities of each person, unit or agency to the total management process?
Issues Related to Management and Treatment
Marguerite Warren has suggested there are four key questions that demand attention which are: 1) Which type of treatment? 2) For whom? (This presupposes satisfactory classification and adequate diagnosis).
3) Under what conditions? 4) In what type of setting?
In view of the diversity of the youngsters, families and social situations involved, the goal must be that of arriving at a more selective use of a variety of treatment settings and techniques for different groups of youngsters. Global statements about how to treat delinquents that fail to take into account differences between individuals and sub-groups within the total delinquent population both ignore what our observations tell us and prevent us from increasing our knowledge, since they obscure issues that could be clarified by sufficiently precise research.
The report of the British Working Party ! entitled "Youth Treatment Centres" (7) stated that any treatment program for this group consists of some mixture of three components: external controls, caring and security. But beyond this, a number of important issues were identified in our discussion.
First is the need for a long-term commitment on the part of the treating agency or person. Treatment plans must be flexible and able to adjust to a changing clinical or social situation, but to be successful there must also be persistence. If one arbitrarily limits the duration of treatment in advance, the child may not only not get better, he may get worse. There is grave danger that at the end of two years, an unintegrated child may bejust overcoming his fear of relating and beginning to invest himself in a therapeutic alliance. To disrupt this relationship prematurely for institutional convenience -that is, because of a policy on the part of the treatment centre not to continue to work with children for more than, for example, two years -will do more than just disrupt his progress, it will reinforce all the child's fears that attachments to others are, as he has suspected, an inevitable prelude to abandonment. This can intensify feelings of abandonment and suspicion of adults who initially present themselves as committed and caring, thus rendering the child even more resistant to subsequent attempts at involvement.
Second, we heard repeatedly of the merits of programs offering some form of sequential treatment, in which an omnipotent, uncontrolled youngster could be admitted to a secure unit from which he could progress, as his capacity for tolerating tension and for behavioural control increased, through other units still within the same centre, each offering greater freedom along with the demand that the child assume more responsibility and exert more appropriate behavioural controls.
Third, we know that a minority of severely disturbed and delinquent adolescents can be treated as outpatients, either in psychotherapy with some sort of conjoint or concurrent therapeutic involvement of their families or as part of an alternative family. More research is needed to identify the characteristics of those adolescents who fall into this group. One suspects that an ability to profit from such interventions is correlated with an ability to bind tension, to internalize conflict and to tolerate an ongoing relationship. If these assumptions are true, they might point the way to intervention that is more effective therapeutically and more desirable economically. But are they true? This remains to be proven.
Fourth, improvement in treatment centres is not always maintained. This forces us to recognize that we must pay more attention to the period of transition from treatment centre to community. The importance of after-care -which seems to work best when provided by those associated with the active treatment -and, crucially, the need for regular and adequate follow-up are essential if we are to evaluate the results of our interventions.
Fifth, Balbernie has suggested that the treatment of choice for the unintegrated child is a long-term placement in a centre offering the opportunity to form a primary relationship. But Godfrey Lister* has drawn attention to the importance of balancing the mixture of youngsters in a given treatment centre. Filling a treatment centre with unintegrated youngsters who are always demanding, constantly hostile and rarely rewarding will be hard -some say too hard -on staff. It has been suggested that one should mix in with the unintegrated majority a few less deprived, more neurotic delinquents, in order to ease the strain on the staff and to provide the nucleus of a group around which treatment can be organized. But this raises several questions. What does it do to the more advanced or more healthy children to be placed in treatment centres geared to youngsters considerably more disturbed than they? Is it merely encouraging contagion and an inappropriate degree of regression? Also, if those more advanced neurotic delinquents could be managed as appropriately and with less disruption in a less expensive form of treatment, such as outpatient psychotherapy or an alternative family, is it justifiable to place them in expensive treatment beds which are much in demand, and which they do not need?
These are important issues to be faced. I agree with Otto Weininger* that part of the answer to problems of staff morale lies not just in the selection of those children admitted but also in the building of an adequate support system for front-line staff. Many agencies and centres do not take sufficient account of the stress of working with such difficult, demanding youngsters and as a result, fail to offer the necessary support. Any institution working with these "impossible" adolescents needs a built-in program of regular support in order to avoid "burning out" staff. Without this, staff "burn-out" will be excessive and the therapeutic potential of the milieu will be undermined, both by the resulting loss of continuity in the child's key relationships and by the effects of staff tension and upset which will compromise their therapeutic effectiveness. Something should be said about the importance of a long-term treatment plan rather than a treatment process guided by what Dr. Barker called short-term pragmatism which, all too often, is merely a euphemism for centres or agencies "flying by the seat of their pants." However, from the agencies' point of view, present and proposed legislation often makes it difficult if not impossible to ensure the continuity of long-term treatment. Recent legislation under Bill 114 (l), which proposes to allow children as young as twelve the right to challenge in full court their continued involvement in treatment, threatens to play into the hands of a minority of manipulative, omnipotent youngsters, many of whom would fall precisely into the "impossible" category. This threatens to displace what should be a therapeutic issue (that is, the inevitable struggle between the child and the milieu) into the legal arena. It disrupts the treatment process, reinforces the child's evasive and omnipotent defences, clogs the courts, monopolizes the time of line staff and social workers. The latter are forced to spend more of their already insufficient time and energy preparing for court and less in treating the youngster, thus increasing treatment costs and making it more difficult to recruit and retain foster parents, group homes and institutional staff. In order to achieve even the possibility of success in treating some of the unintegrated or 1 2 and 1 3 youngsters who fall into the "impossible" group, we must be prepared and able to make a commitment in advance to "hang in" and work with them from two to four years, if necessary. This will not be possible under the proposed Bill (l).
But taking this position brings us up against the civil rights advocates who demand, "Why should we allow you to contract in advance to hold this child in treatment for 3-4 years, especially if he decides he doesn't want it? And how do you know it will work?" If we are honest, we can only say we do not know that it will work, and the child may get worse -more difficult and upset -before he gets better. "And," we should add, "We can safely predict that although at some point in the course of treatment the child is ·likely to demand to be released from therapy, allowing him to withdraw half-way down the road will likely do more harm than no treatment at all". Imperfect as such a program of management may be, it probably offers the child, and society, the best chance he or she has, given the present state of our knowledge.
At a time when governments everywhere in North America are increasingly forced to cut back their financial commitments, Quentin Rae-Grant* has raised the question of whether we, as a society, are prepared to commit our time and our resources towards an end product which may offer only modest gains. If, as he suspects, we are not, he wonders if we are barking up the wrong tree in suggesting new and at times costly programs of treatment and evaluation. In response, Peter Jaffe* stated that it should be easy to demonstrate a need for the services we propose both in terms of the community's need for protection and also by comparing the cost of what is proposed with that of the alternative. Even ignoring for the moment humane and therapeutic considerations and looking at the situation in purely economic terms, what in the long run is the better investment: one long-term placement that has a chance of succeeding or the usual series of multiple, disastrous short-term placements (including 10-11 foster homes, 3-6 residential treatment centres) passed through en route to predictable failure? If we present the alternatives in this way -and this will involve marshalling our data and presenting the case for definitive intervention strongly and well -we should be able to demonstrate that any fiscal savings achieved through failure to provide needed services are more illusory than real.
But while we must recognize and respond effectively to attacks on needed programs because of their cost, we should not stop there. It is up to our professions, working together in a degree of partnership rarely achieved in the past, to educate and to sell primarily government, but also the community at large, on the need for changes in programs and policies essential for adequate service. Too often government is regarded as an all-powerful, anonymous adversary while we, the professionals, are left impotent and excluded from the decision-making process. These attitudes should not be allowed to continue to serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is not good enough to abdicate to government the initiative for program development and then, later, to scapegoat government for deficiencies in the programs provided. It is up to us to establish and give top priority to developing ongoing consultative relationships with government, and to use these both to criticize and to provide alternative solutions that are theoretically sound, obviously practical and readily accessible to evaluation. In this regard, the initiative and openness of the newly formed Division of Children's Services is welcomed in eliciting consultation around proposed changes in child welfare legislation. We are encouraged by the Division's apparent willingness to take these consultations seriously. It is hoped that what has already begun will continue to develop into an open and productive collaboration between the Division and our professional organizations. Our dealings with those working within the Division should increasingly develop the characteristics of any good consultation, that is, an interdisciplinary relationship based on acknowledged mutual need, direct and open communication, respect for each others' special problems, point of view and area of expertise, combined with a recognition that our common goals can best be achieved by a truly effective collaboration. The establishment and maintenance of such a collaboration must be seen as one of the helping professions' top priorities in the immediate future.
Issues Related to the Interface Between the Courts and the Mental Health Profession
The relationship between the courts on the one hand, and social agencies and treatment centres on the other, is complex and deserving of considerable comment because of its potential difficulty. Judges and clinicians often see situations from different vantage points. Furthermore, new legislation affecting this area is now in the course of preparation.( 1)
We can probably agree on two basic principles. First, it is the responsibility of the court to ensure that the basic rights of each individual and of the community are protected. Secondly, it is the responsibility of treatment centres, clinicians and agencies to provide children with care and, if necessary, treatments that are at least adequate, and preferably superior.
There is a third basic principle that may prove more contentious, however. How does one develop a mechanism whereby those providing the care and/ or treatment external and objective experts from within their own professions if issues related to the nature or process of the treatment are raised. Two models were discussed repeatedly during the workshop.
-I) Currently, in Ontario, the Court on hearing the evidence, determines whether a youngster is delinquent or in need of care. Should either be the case, the judge then assigns what he considers an appropriate disposition, at times being guided in his prescription by the advice of a clinician or agency. But this raises an important issue. Is the judge being asked to make what is, in effect, a clinical decision? Judge Karswick* has said he is not, since the judge, as a reasonable man, knows he is not a clinician and is prepared to accept the guidance of clinicians in matters of disposition, as long as their suggestions are reasonable and no body's rights (including th ose of society) are violated. He suggests that the judge has both the right and the responsibility to weigh what clinicians say about a child's needs against the rights of the child, the rights of society to be protected and the obligations of society to provide the resources prescribed by the clinicians, often at the expense of already heavily taxed citizens.
That may be acceptable, if the judge is a reasonable man. But what if he is not? What if he consistently and unreasonably ignores expert consultation and makes clinical decisions for which he is not qualified? The average judge is no more qualified to make what are essentially clinical decisions than the average social worker or psychiatrist is to render judgments on the most subtle and intricate points of law. To expect him to do so is to encourage him to exceed his area of competence. And yet our judges, often acting on several highly complicated and unfamiliar cases at one time, are expected to make major clinical decisions of a highly complex nature within a relatively brief period of time and often with less than adequate information. And what recourse has the agency in the face of what it considers an inappropriate clinical judgment made arbitrarily by an idiosyncratic judge who repeatedly rejects the advice of duly qualified clinicians? It can launch an appeal; but appeals are lengthy. They strain the time and already over-extended resources of the centre or agency, leaving youngsters in limbo and disrupting and obstructing their care or treatment, often for prolonged periods of time. How ineffective or destructive must such a judge be before he is removed? Such judges do exist and are well known, but those administering the courts either cannot or will not take action to remove them.
2) A second alternative, involving a two-tier system, had some initial appeal. In its first stage, the court would determine whether a youngster was in a state of delinquency or in need of care. In the second stage, disposition would be prescribed and administered by a panel of clinical experts or, possibly, by a Children's Aid Society acting in loco parentis for a child coming into care. This solution would place clinical decisions back in the hands of the clinicians, but it too causes some concern. It does violence to existing law, it further diffuses responsibility and accountability and it is not certain that there are any fewer incompetent social workers or psychiatrists than there are incompetent judges. Ultimately, then, the two-tier system does not seem to offer much of an improvement.
In so far as the child remains the ward-of his parents -as long as they have not been found legally incompetent -then involvement in treatment should be a matter of consent between parents and treatment centre. As Dr. Solnit* has said repeatedly, "as long as a bond between child and parents exists and as long as those parents are not so inadequate that they are designated incom-petent that bond, whatever its nature, should be protected". Time and again it was expressed that those youngsters who do best in any form of treatment are those who have someone outside the treatment centre to go back to. If, however, the parents have been designated incompetent and the child is a ward of the Children's Aid Society, then involvement in treatment should be negotiated between the Society (as guardian) and the treatment centre.
The role of the child in contracting for treatment should vary with the age of the child and with his ability to give responsible and informed consent. Wherever possible, the child should agree, after adequate exposure to what the treatment centre is like. If he agrees -and the older the child, the more important this is -the chances of his therapy proving successful are thereby enhanced. But it should be recognized that in Ontario there are powerful forces tending to place an inappropriate amount of power in the hands of the child whose custody is in dispute. In all such cases, the opinions and feelings of the child should be seriously considered, but the ultimate decision should remain that of the adults who are responsible for the child's welfare. The dangers of placing an inappropriate degree of control in the hands of children are discussed in more detail elsewhere. (2) Representatives of the treatment agencies have said that they must know. that there is some person or agency standing behind them when the therapeutic struggle gets rough and the child seeks to avoid the anxiety, depression and rage he is stirring up by opting out of therapy. Judge Karswick stated that in this situation the courts can support the work of the treatment and care-taking agencies. He suggests that where a child wants out but parents, Children's Aid Societies or Treatment Centres feel he should remain in treatment, the agencies should not be afraid to bring the case back to court to seek a judgment in support of their position. Those judges present agreed that if we (clinicians and agencies) can make a reasonable case; that if a child in seeking to be removed from an arrangement for his care or a problem of treatment can be demonstrated to be acting against his own best interests or incapable of giving an informed decision, then the courts will stand behind us. They ask us to credit them with a little common sense and as much concern for the child as we clinicians have. They further stated: "We, the judges have a role to play that is different from yours. You, the agencies and treatment centres have the responsibility of determining and advocating what you feel is best for the child. As judges, we must balance your recommendations against what we feel are the legitimate rights of the child and society's need for protection. That is part of our legal process. You, the Children's Aid Societies and treatment centres must be accountable to someone".
At this point I have to balance my concerns about clinical decisions being made by non-clinicians with my awareness that I have known many cases where agencies and professionals were doing poor work without realizing it. I also recall how, at times, I have realized only in retrospect that my work on a particular case was not up to my usual standard. Finally, I think of how often I have noted that those of my colleagues in psychiatry, psychology or social work who appear to know it all are usually the ones whose work I respect the least.
And so, I eventually conclude that probably it is important for parents, older children, agencies and treatment centres to submit to an external review periodically, either on a regular basis -every six months, as in Great Britain -or on demand, though no more often than every six months. But who should provide that review? Should it be the judge, or should it be a panel of qualified independent clinicians co-opted from private or clinic practice by the Ministry? The latter mechanism would provide a way of having clinical work reviewed by leaders of the profession who could, in cases where the issue was not a clinical one, request a hearing in full court.
In summary then, there is a need for accountability within Children's Aid Societies and treatment services, but also a major concern about courts making clinical decisions and serving as the quality control for treatment centres and social agencies. There needs to be a clearer and more appropriate division of responsibility between judges and mental health clinicians. I might close this portion of the discussion by stating that the precise definition of the role of the judge and the clinicians seems a much more complex, less black-and-white matter now than it was before this workshop. The fact that I gained a greater understanding and appreciation for the judges' position and their difficulties in these issues -and that I consequently re-examined more critically much that I had previously taken for granted -was for me, one of the major areas of growth during the workshop.
As a practising child psychiatrist and a long-time consultant to Children's Aid Societies, I support the principle of regular periodic case reviews but have several other concerns about these taking place routinely in court. One of these arises from the degree that agency and institutional staff are intimidated by judges. This was demonstrated repeatedly at the workshop, rather to the surprise ofthejudges, who see themselves as much more reasonable and responsive than agency staff see them. In actual fact, they are undoubtedly more benign and reasonable than workers consider them to be, but as long as workers remain terrified, the image of the judge will continue to be more important than the reality. The judge, representing as he does in reality the authority of the entire judicial system and of the state itself, while serving, at a fantasy level, as a symbol of potentially crushing authority, can be a source of potential fear. One of the judges at the workshop told of the terror he experienced when summoned to appear in court to answer to even so minor a matter as the delinquency of his pet dog. If judges are terrified by judges, is it surprising that agency staff are intimidated, or that their anxiety and inhibition pre-occupies, in-hibits and interferes with their performance before and during an appearance in court? As a direct result of the workshop, an attempt will be made to bring together in informal discussion some of the judges in the Toronto Family Court with workers from the Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto to dispel misunderstandings, clarify roles and expectations, undermine stereotypes and to extend further some of the humanization of working relationships along the interface between law and the clinical professions that began at the workshop. Should that meeting prove successful, we hope to repeat it at regular intervals in order to increase worker confidence and competence during court appearances, and to help agency staff learn to use the court as an ally rather than an adversary in attempts to manage difficult and resistant cases.
Secondly, workers have expressed their fear that judges and/or review panels might weigh too heavily what a child says on a single, stressful occasion either in open court or in chambers, which may be far from what he really means. For example; a fourteen year-old boy was seen together with his parents in a family assessment set up in response to the parents' attempt to appeal a court ruling making the child a temporary ward of a Children's Aid Society. As long as he was in the presence of his parents, the boy repeatedly insisted he wanted to be returned to his family. At one point duringthe session, however, he asked to be excused to go the washroom. While out of the room, he left a note with the examiner's secretary which stated explicitly that he had been lying during the session because he could not bear to tell the truth in the presence of his parents, knowing this would upset them. Judges will, not infrequently, give weight to a child's single direct statement in court or in chambers above a mass of evidence, verbal and behavioural, obtained over an extended period of time. Many children, even in the absence of the parents, will not openly state that they do not want to return home out of guilt, even though their play, their dreams, their fantasies and their behaviour may clearly indicate to the trained observer that they know they are better off away from home. What children say, especially under stress conditions, is often not what they mean. Too often, unsupported statements made by a child or early adolescent in court or chambers are uncritically accepted as literal truth. This is both naive and potentially destructive.
I am further concerned about even more increasing the backlog in our courts, already so badly overloaded, by making judicial reviews in full court much more readily accessible as proposed in the revised version of the Child Welfare Act (I). This could lead only to further delays, to more children being left longer in limbo and to greater disruptions in the continuity of care and treatment.
On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly clear that we in the mental health professions must learn to recognize and to utilize more effectively, opportunities for using the courts to support us in our work, instead of failing to do so and then scapegoating them for the results of our own ineffectiveness. Over the years, clinicians and judges have tended to see each other as adversaries; the question is whether we can learn, at least on occasion to work together as allies.
Finally, there is a principle in medicine that patients have the right to refuse treatment, even if they endanger their lives by doing so. In extreme cases, such as when the life of· a child too young to give informed consent is endangered by parental refusal to accept treatment for that child (for example, the child of Jehovah's Witnesses who requires an exchange transfusion), the courts may over-rule the parents, designate the child in need of protection and allow a Children's Aid Society to authorize treatment. We need to give more thought to the question of when we have the right to enforce treatment on a child, and when that child and family have the legitimate right to refuse, even at the risk of harming themselves. Such factors as age, the severity of the problem, the ability or inability to give informed consent, the presence or absence of danger to the community are among those for consideration. We often polarize around these issues which, though we think of them as black and white are, in effect, shades of gray. This is an area where our therapeutic zeal may require more tempering with an awareness of the rights of others under the law to refuse even what we think is good for them.
Some Issues Related to Prevention
Andrew Crowcroft* repeatedly suggested that we shift our focus from treatment to prevention, that is, towards finding opportunities for providing earlier intervention with a particular emphasis on supplying the primary experiences that so many children, who in adolescence are seen as "impossible", lacked in their earlier years. But how can this be done? Possibly one place to begin is within the family and, more specifically, by recognizing the importance of and the need to protect whenever possible the mother-child attachment. How can we help and support parents to be better parents, recognizing the unparalleled stresses on the nuclear family in North American society including the greater number of single parents and reconstituted families and the multiple social, economic and psychological pressures contributing to this alarming trend; the loss of support of extended family; the breakdown of traditions of parenting; the decreased status given parenting, and especially mothering, in our society; the societal tendency to value "doing one's own thing" above commitment or service to others including one's children; the general drift away from moral and religious values which affects family members both directly and indirectly by its effects on family cohesion; the immobilizing effect of information overload that Toffler has termed "future shock" (5) , that leaves people feeling inundated, overwhelmed, intimidated and finally trapped in frustrated, cynical and passive paralysis? These then, are some of the prevailing pressures whose effects we seek to prevent. But what can be done to counteract them at the level of primary intervention?
Here, immediately, we run into two major problems. The first is that any solutions proposed are more likely to be picked up by the middle class than by those who are exposed to the greatest pressure and who, therefore, are at greatest risk, the socially disadvantaged. Thus those who most need help are likely to benefit least from our attempts at preventive intervention.
Ivan IIIich* (3) has drawn to our attention another pro blem which, in the long run may prove even harder to circumvent. He sees one of the major problems of our industrialized, highly specialized society as the loss of autonomy and the surrendering by the individual of his traditional role of assuming the responsibility for his and his family's destiny. As this proceeds, we increasingly lose confidence, we are overwhelmed, skills essential to survival atrophy from disuse secondary to prolonged reliance on others and we become increasingly passive and ineffectual, leaving it to others -and especially to society as a whole -to assume what were once considered individual responsibilities. Examples of this are the care of the aged and the dying, an increased reliance on welfare and other social services, universal medicare and the gradual expectation that the educational establishment assume what were once considered family responsibilities (sex education, moral instruction, and preparation for marriage). This trend towards abdication of individual responsibility and increased reliance on government is an alarming one. But what can be done about it? As IIIich points out, there is a paradox here. Any government-designed program meant to encourage individual initiative or to raise the level of anything becomes just one more intrusion of the state into what ought to be the territory of the individual, thereby decreasing "the power of people to respond to challenges and to cope with changes in their bodies and their environments". Thus the program we initiate to bolster the parents of today may even further erode the initiative and confidence of the parents of tomorrow.
But if indeed we are to intervene in a preventive way, how and where should we begin? Naomi Rae-Grant" has suggested that what is needed is a lobby to impress on both government and society at large, a child's right to grow up in a family within a society responsive to his needs. In order to do this effectively, we will clearly have to coordinate our efforts, but first we have to agree upon priorities. This will not be-easy, We all have our pet areas of concern, each of them important, but unless there is agreement on priorities, we shall present as divided and competitive thereby confusing governments and 'undermining our credibility.
What can we as individual professionals do in the interests of primary prevention? Andrew Crowcroft stressed the importance of adequate early intervention when the "impossible" child of tomorrow presents today in our clinics, offices and daycare centres as a preschooler. The preschooler who is not forming a primary attachment, whose family and social situation are clearly in jeopardy can often be identified. But how many of us in our clinical practice do recognize and identify those children as seriously at risk at such a young age? And, even if we do, how many of our programs do anything substantial to significantly alter these children's life experiences? Crowcroft has suggested, and rightly so, that many and possibly the majority of preschoolers already showing signs of significant disturbance and whose family situations show that they are chronically and severely at risk, fail to receive obvious, necessary and sufficient intervention because they fall between the stools of public health, pediatrics and psychiatry and because too few of us, within psychiatry, can approach their situations in a manner in which we feel competent and confident. How often have we made only a token intervention with a disturbed preschooler because we considered him or, more often, his family situation unworkable or impossible? If we review what actually happens to those preschoolers who present to our clinics, we may find that this sort of slip-shod disposition occurs much too frequently. Naomi Rae-Grant rightly drew to our attention Michael Rutter's work on the cumulative effect of co-existing stresses. She quotes from Rutter (6) who, after recognizing that not all children appear to be equally damaged by an undesirable social environment, suggests factors which may serve to bolster the individual child, thus increasing his potential for survival within even an alien milieu. This line of work is deserving of considerably more attention than it has received. How can we find ways of bolstering or supporting the child at risk? Each of us works or could consult within areas in which we might have some influence on improving the quality of care for children, for example: the quality of day care; the atmosphere in our schools; the quality of alternatives to the family made available to children whose families cannot raise them; and the quality and range of services available. For us to do so is not just our professional duty; it is possibly our greatest privilege.
Where do we go from here? First, it is important that we agree to coordinate our research. Until there is a common classification, the Tower of Babel that continues to confuse and confound what should be mutual efforts at understanding and intervention will continue to exist. Secondly, we must in all future research define with clarity and precision what group of youngsters we are dealing with, what we are doing to them, with what result. Follow-up for one, two and three years is essential in order to know the effectiveness of our interventions and the natural course of the conditions with which we are dealing. Without these measures, we run the risk of obscuring more than advancing understanding. But we should also bear in mind that there is little value in long-term follow-ups, as there are so many simultaneous occurrences in the life of the child that will compete with and contaminate the effects of the program under study. The main questions to which we should address ourselves in a properly focused and coordinated manner are these:
• What is the natural history of the disorders we are studying? • How can we more precisely select the treatment of choice for each subgroup of "impossible" children? • Given an "impossible" social and family situation, why do some children turn out to be survivors while others drift towards psychopathy? (Here we get into the question of studying the cumulative effects of simultaneous stresses, and of sources which favour continued integration in the face of stress.) • What ways are there to intervene effectively at a community level? Shortly before arriving at the workshop, I saw a Steinberg cartoon in The New Yorker. In it, a man on a bulldozer was pushing a huge boulder up a steep hill. He was, of course, a twentieth-century Sisyphus. A number of us have drawn on assorted mythologies in the course of this conference. Naomi Rae-Grant turned to Slavonic mythology for her description of the Ovinnik, while Clive Chamberlain alluded to that of the Old Testament in using the metaphor of the Tower of Babel. But I would refer to Greek mythology and select Sisyphus as the symbol of this conference. It was Sisyphus who offended the gods and was punished by being condemned for eternity to roll a great stone up a hill only to have it roll down so that he would then have to push it up again. He was given no choice as to whether or not he would keep pushing the rock. The only choice available to him was whether he would do so reluctantly or willingly, but depending on the choice he made, his life would be one either of bitter despair or of triumph over adversity. Similarly we have no choice as to whether or not we will deal with these children, impossible though they may be at times. However, as the workshop has richly illustrated, we do have considerable choice as to how we deal with them. If we choose, as Sisyphus did, to accept the difficulties and to transcend them and if we, as individuals and professions, can succeed in working together, not only will our work be enhanced by our collaboration but the quality of our professional lives will be simultaneously enriched.
We, like Sisyphus, will never get right to the top of the hill. It would be hu bris for us to think we are going to cure the problem of the "impossible" child. But if we choose to shoulder our burden willingly and creatively it is very possible that, as a result of our efforts, some of these children will prove to be less "impossible" and society, as a whole, may be a little bit better as a result of our efforts. Apres avoir examine les mythes courants (reves de sauvetage, difficultes entourant I'utilisation therapeutique de l'autorite), il examine les difficultes d'ordre therapeutique et juridique que souleve l'exercice de l'autorite aune epoque de plus en plus sensible au moindre accroc, reel ou imaginaire, aux droits de l'enfant.
Resume
Apres En merne temps qu-il reconnait I'irnportance de la prevention directe, I'auteur examine certains points qui cornpromettent son efficacite. Pour conclure, il reclame une meilleure coordination de la classification et de la recherche et enumere certaines questions importantes autour desquelles la recherche doit s'organiser.
